The central argument of this paper is that the global expansion of sovereign nation-states has been accompanied by the emergence of a particular type of modern individual, homo nationis. The general significance of this argument lies in the fact that this personality type, which is either taken for granted (untheorized) or ignored, constitutes an integral component of modern social order. That is, in addition to the constitutional and institutional foundations of the state and its political economy, the nation-state has a psychosocial foundation -a "national habitus." The concepts of homo nationis and national habitus underscore that modern individuals are historical individuals, i.e. they have personality structures that are unlike those of individuals in other historical epochs, and that they should be explicitly conceptualized as such, rather than as a transhistorical homo oeconomicus or homo sociologicus. Many fundamental social processes, including those discussed under globalization, can be better explained with such a conception. The historical-structural context for homo nationis is the world order of nation-states that has only recently finished formally incorporating all other social formations from tribes to the remnants of empires, as well as the specific state-society to which the individual belongs.
society," but in Norbert Elias's memorable phrase, of a society of individuals.
2 It is the so-called Hobbesian problem of order that turns a useful analytical distinction into a misleading ontological separation. "The problem of social order" is a generic name or category for what are always concrete, historically situated problems of order in particular social systems. In its contemporary historical context the problem of order refers above all to societies contained in sovereign states composed of increasingly individualized members. 3 But "the problem of order" can refer to any social system, from the global system to the family, from organizations to loose networks, in the past and in the future. The globalization debate has called into question the future of the sovereign state framework, exposing the historical character of this basic pillar of modern social order. What has not been exposed and problematized in the same fashion is the historical character of the membership making up modern societies. In what sense are individuals historical?
What I want to argue in this paper is that neither homo oeconomicus nor homo sociologicus is a sufficiently rich, sufficiently historicized, concept to deal with the dominant type of human beings that has emerged in the twentieth century. I propose as an alternative the historically specific homo nationis: the individual who is born and raised in a particular national culture, and who lives most of her life in a nation-state of which she is a citizen. As a product of the emerging global order composed of nationstates, homo nationis became a truly global phenomenon in the second part of the twentieth century after two world wars and numerous anti-colonial struggles, all fought in the name of the nation. The globalization debate has drawn our attention to migrants, transnationals and binationals who do not neatly fit this conception. However, it is important not to exaggerate the relative significance of such populations and ignore the larger historical trend. Homines nationes have become the overwhelming majority of the world's population in the course of the twentieth century. I will argue that this element of personality structure is not exclusive -real people have many additional personality characteristics -and it is not necessarily the dominant personality structure in every contemporary society -some societies have little national coherence and strong regionally, religiously or linguistically based subcultures. Nevertheless, the "nationalized personality structure" is fundamental in most state-societies today. Homo nationis, like homo oeconomicus is driven, by individual interests and, like homo sociologicus, by social norms. However, a particular nationality -or national identity in a broad sensegives a crucial and distinct psychocultural specificity and political and economic context to people's individual interests and social norms at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
It should be emphasized again that there are many other competing and complementary elements that go beyond, or make for internal diversity in, distinct "national characters." But for the most part "national habitus" -a key phrase that I will explain in detail below -expresses what has become a dominant habitus type in the world over the past century. The national habitus, a nationally specific personality structure, is the socio-cultural complement to the nation-state structure. It has emerged gradually at different times in different places under different political and economic conditions and is constantly evolving. Being historically specific, it is unlikely to remain a dominant social habitus in the long run as globalizing political and economic forces seem to be weakening the foundations of the national habitus -the sovereign state, the national economy, national culture. It is unclear, however, when and how this shift will occur. One future scenario is the gradual eclipse of the national by transnational or global forms of habitus and postnational identities, another the further fragmentation of the modern self into a variety of postmodern identities. A third is the survival of national habitus alongside, or in combination with, transnational and postmodern forms of habitus.
Of course all three may come together in particular combinations. In other words, these different forms of habitus are not mutually exclusive. The focus of this paper is on revealing just how pervasive and yet largely unrecognized and taken for granted national habitus is at the current historical juncture at which globalizing processes dominate the collective imagination. One implication of the deep-rootedness of this psychocultural formation is that it is likely to stay around for some time even amongst processes of rapid economic and political "denationalization." Psychosocial change is widely assumed to lag behind social-structural change (Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Elias What is habitus?
In current debates, the concept of social habitus (the Latin term for habit) is usually associated with the recent work of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (e.g. 1984; 1990 (Camic 1986 (Camic , 1050 ." Take the following short examples which are extracted from the detailed analysis by Camic (1986) . First, Durkheim:
[I]t is not enough to direct our attention to the superficial portion of our consciousness; for the sentiments, the ideas which come to the surface are not, by far, those which have the most influence on our conduct. What must be reached are the habits [. . .] these are the real forces which govern us (Durkheim 1905 (Durkheim -1906 quoted in Camic 1986 quoted in Camic , 1052 .
Contrary to the assumptions underlying homo oeconomicus, Weber considered habit to be of "far-reaching economic significance" in regulating the behaviour and interaction of economic units, as well as fundamental attitudes towards work and what is now called "professionalism." More generally, he saw habit as crucially involved in various processes of group formation, such as "mere custom . . . facilitating intermarriage," "the formation of feelings of 'ethnic' identification," and "the creation of community" (Weber 1922a, 320) . " [T] he great bulk of all everyday action [approaches an] almost automatic reaction to habitual stimuli which guide behavior in a course which has been repeatedly followed" (Weber 1922, 337; quoted in Camic 1986 quoted in Camic , 1059 . In Weber's view, habit was also at the foundation of modern political and legal orders (PS313; WG655). Camic (1986, 1062) argues that "Weber's writings on traditionalism may be seen as developing (in a way that, to my knowledge, has nowhere been matched), a macrosociological perspective on habit." Not only Durkheim and Weber, but also Marx, Comte, Tönnies, Simmel and other social theorists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (Camic 1986 (Camic , 1050 employed the concept of habit in the broad sense of guiding action, influencing the emergence of norms, and posing powerful inertia to social change.
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The concept of habit became a victim in the struggle of early twentieth-century American sociologists for academic influence and recognition as a discipline in universities. Since more established disciplines like psychology and physiology had occupied the field with their own conceptions and explanations of habit, it was abandoned by sociologists largely for political reasons. The preeminent American sociologist Talcott Parsons, probably the most influential Weber interpreter and translator in the Anglo-Saxon world, was a key figure in banishing the concept from the modern sociologist's toolbox. Readers of English translations of Durkheim and Weber in the latter half of the twentieth century were ill-prepared to recognize the concept of habit as of any particular significance for the social sciences, even though it played such an important role in their works (Camic 1986 however, that there is no overall historical necessity at work that drives societies towards ever higher levels of differentiation and integration -the way Spencer thought. There are 7 I consciously depart here from conceptions such as Bourdieu's social field, which alludes probably to much the same thing but is a vague and idiosyncratic social ontology. Regardless of the unfortunate connotations of the phrase "social system," I adopt Mario Bunge's systemic philosophy (e.g. 2003, 1998) which has nothing to do with system theories such as those of Parsons or Luhmann. 8 Camic, writing in the mid-1980s, does not mention Elias once.
periods and places where we can observe long-term stagnation or de-differentiation and disintegration. Elias poses two central questions: are there changes in affect and control structures of members of particular societies that over generations run in the same direction; and can these changes in personality structure be related to social structural changes? (Elias 1978) In the introduction added to the 1968 edition of Process, Elias delivers a powerful critique of Parsons' system thinking that foreshadows many later criticisms of structural- Some of these arguments have more recently reappeared in the globalization debate, especially those that have identified as problematic the assumption of the nation-state as the "natural" unit of analysis. How this criticism affects the argument of this paper that national habitus should be treated as central will be addressed in the next section. Elias's critique, however, goes further than this particular argument. He regards as especially pernicious the widespread static conception of individual and society in contemporary social science, and the related failure to adequately conceptualize the process character of social life. A major obstacle in this respect, according to him, is:
the extraordinary conviction carried in European societies since roughly the Renaissance by the self-perception of human beings in terms of their own isolation, the severance of their own "inside" from everything "outside." [. . .] This self-perception in terms of one's own isolation, of the invisible wall dividing one's own "inner" self from all the people and things "outside," takes on for a large number of people in the course of the modern age the same immediate force of conviction that the movement of the sun around an earth situated at the center of the cosmos possessed in the Middle Ages (Elias 1991, 250-251; 260) .
This shifting balance between "I" and "we," from almost exclusive emphasis on "we" to primary emphasis on "I," this historical process of individualization represents one of the major psychosocial outcomes of the civilizing process in Western Europe. The long-term historical trend towards increasing social differentiation and integration into ever larger social units culminated in the creation of a global system of nation-states in the twentieth century. As the literatures on economic globalization, international governance and cultural transnationalization forcefully suggest, it would be naive to assume that the current age of globalization will leave the existing nation-state order intact. Whatever validity the concept of national habitus may have had, many argue that it is increasingly a personality structure 11 of the past that is being replaced by fragmented postnational selves and higher level transnational identities. In this long-term historical perspective, Elias himself predicts the eventual decline of the nation-state order. In the meantime, however, he notes, "[i]t may be that the nation-state-based weidentity of the individual in our day is almost taken for granted. One does not always remember clearly enough that the role of the state as a frame of reference for the weidentity of the great majority of all members of a state, i.e. the state's role as nation state, is of relatively recent date. (Elias 1991, 206) Only in the course of the two great wars of this century did the populations of the more developed industrial states take on the character of nations in the more modern sense of the word, and their states the character of nation states. Nation states, one might say, are born in wars and for wars.
Here we find the explanation why, among the various layers of we-identity, the state level of integration today carries special weight and a special emotional charge. The integration plane of the state, more than any other layer of we-identity, has in the consciousness of most members the function of a survival unit, a protection unit on which depends their physical and social security in the conflicts of human groups and in cases of physical catastrophe (Elias 1991, 208) .
The continuing individualization process diagnosed by Elias, and the related fragmentation of identities described by postmodern theorists 12 , would suggest that allencompassing collective identities, especially national identities, are similarly being 10 See however the work of Michele Lamont (1992; who also provides a critique of Bourdieu's conception of habitus. 11 If indeed it is recognized as such. 12 For a critical assessment of these positions from a viewpoint similar to the one presented here, see Billig (1995) , esp. ch. 6-7. A different view examining the relationship between Foucault and Bauman, on the one hand, and Elias, on the other, can be found in Dennis Smith 2001. weakened and undermined. Individuality, it appears, is increasingly becoming a unifiying characteristic and source of common identification for many people of different nationalities. 13 While at one level this commonality is real, 14 it does not follow that it occurs at the expense of or transcends the framework of the national culture.
Powerful as the advance of individualization has been in recent times, in relation to the nationstate plane we-identity has actually strengthened. One often finds that people try to overcome the contradiction between their self-perception as a we-less I, as a totally isolated individual, and their emotional involvement in the we-group of the nation by a strategy of encapsulation. Their selfperceptions as an individual and as a representative of a we-group, as a Frenchman, Englishman, West German, American, etc., are assigned to different compartments of their knowledge, and these compartments communicate only very tenuously with each other (Elias 1991, 209) .
This radical separation is facilitated by the taken-for-grantedness or "second nature" that national habitus represents for most people most of the time. 15 Much the same seems to hold for individuality as a part of habitus. The timeless, placeless self, personally experienced by a growing number of people -the subjective part of individualization processes -is however firmly tied to its national culture as source and reference point.
The deeply rooted nature of the distinctive national characteristics and the consciousness of national we-identity closely bound up with them can serve as a graphic example of the degree to which the social habitus of the individual provides a soil in which personal, individual differences can flourish. The individuality of the particular Englishman, Dutchman, Swede or German represents, in a sense, the personal elaboration of a common social, and in this case national, habitus (Elias 1991, 210) .
The individual vs society dualism is therefore misleading even when we speak of the process of individualization itself. Individuality presupposes a particular cultural environment, and the central part of this environment is the historically evolved national culture. Homo nationis as an individual is constituted by his particular nationality -not exclusively, but primarily. If this argument asserting the significance of national habitus in contemporary societies is valid, then national habitus must be assumed to play an often 13 The EU as the leading case of transnational integration provides an ideal testing ground for whether and how strong postnational identities can emerge. See e.g. Cederman 2001; Soysal 2002. 14 I.e. in terms of similar values as measured, for instance, in the cross-national surveys of Inglehart (e.g. 1997) . 15 The best recent treatment of this "banal" nature of nationalism is probably Billig 1995. unrecognized role in a range of contemporary problems of order. This will further explored in the next section.
Why and where is national habitus significant?
The concept of national habitus highlights that, in addition to formal institutions and abstractly rational individuals, the modern order rests on psychosocial foundations -what phrases such as "consent" or "nation as a daily plebiscite" (Renan) allude to, with the important proviso that habitus is much more encompassing and less voluntaristic than consent or voting. These foundations may be strong and evolving, or they may be brittle and dissolving. In either case, they exist in every modern state. 16 They cannot be reduced to individual choices or systemic structures, though both are involved. The development of national habitus is structurally favoured by the global state system. 17 It is functionally significant since national habitus plays a fundamental role in many social processes, as the remainder of this paper will illustrate. 18 A social process like the development of a national habitus is a cultural fact, produced for the most part not by design but the result of unintended consequences of human action. A strong functionalist interpretation of national habitus as a "precondition" for modern society can therefore be misleading (cf. Gellner). 19 The same holds for a causal interpretation that sees national habitus as a "necessary" outcome of the emergence of the modern state system. I propose to start with the more modest assumption that national habitus is a form of personality structure that has evolved in the context of a global system composed of states, and that it is causally involved in many facets of how this global system works. Each national habitus is a particular, historically specific, concrete social formation that has evolved under structural conditions (i.e. the rise of the nation-state system) that are normatively reflected in the theory of sovereignty. This should give us sufficient room to examine the actual effects of national habitus on political and economic processes without 16 Note that the claim here is not that national habitus works everywhere as the only, or necessarily major, psychosocial foundation of modern order. Such generalizations would be untenable given the diversity of nation-states. 17 There are other structural features of a state-society, such as internal linguistic or religious divisions, that do not favour the development of a national habitus. 18 See also a new set of analyses on the significance of economic nationalism under globalization (Helleiner and Pickel 2004 

National culture in business studies
It may come as surprise that business studies can be found among the academic fields explicitly recognizing the significance of the "national" -rather than merely employing it implicitly as the basic unit of analysis. Equipped with the assumption that economic actors are among the major driving forces of globalization, one might expect the management literature to be busy devising social technologies for the global firm, based on a conception of homo oeconomicus. Unlike their colleagues in mainstream economics, however, management theorists seem much more sympathetic to homo sociologicus. In fact, the literature sampled below suggests that homo nationis is no stranger in their field. . Salter and Sharp (2001) show that even apparently minor cultural differences in management control and accounting such as those between Canada and the United States can be the source of serious coordination problems. Other studies address the importance of nationality in behavioural attributes of executives (Hitt 1997) , entrepreneurial orientation (Kemelgor 2002) , and investment conduct (Thomas and Waring 1999) . The global scale of many firms' activities has led to a search for "best practices," though as Hope and Muhlemann (2001) argue with respect to production and operations management, these practices are often not transferable from one national context to another. National differences, or inadequate national cultural fit (Weber et al. 20 Contrast this rich conception of economic culture with economist L. Thurow's (2000) thin conception:
'Traditionally, culture is older people telling younger people what they should believe and how they should act. What is frightening about the new electronic culture is that it is a 'for-sale' culture that jumps right across the generations directly to the young. In contrast to older forms of culture, this culture does not have any specific values that it wants to inculcate. Those who produce this culture provide whatever sells--whatever the young will buy. It is a culture of economics (profits) rather than a culture of values (morals) '. 1996) , have also played a significant role in international mergers and acquisitions, from preacquisition management (Angwin 2001) to the integrating mechanisms used to establish headquarter-subsidiary control (Lubatkin et al. 1998) . As Calori et al. (1994) conclude, firms are guided by their national administrative heritage when they acquire companies abroad.
The design of managerial information systems (Ishman et al. 2001 ) and the information seeking behaviour of banks (Zaheer and Zaheer 1997) 
National Economies and Economic Nations
Based on a geographical definition of national economy, national economies do indeed appear to be dissolving insofar as economic activity, especially finance and trade, is rapidly internationalizing. But economic activity, especially production and consumption, still occurs in particular national social and political contexts which in turn provide fundamental resources and constraints for such global-level economic activity.
Two literatures have made particularly significant contributions to establishing the continuing significance of the national economy. The first is the literature critical of the 'new global economy' thesis (see e.g. Wade 1996; Zysman 1996; Sorge 1999 ). The second is the 'varieties of capitalism' literature that calls into question the convergence thesis according to which globalization is producing one dominant model of market economy (Berger and Dore 1996; Goricheva 1997; Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997; Streeck and Crouch 1997; Streeck 1992) . For the purposes of our discussion, the following results are particularly important. Extension of economic activity beyond national boundaries does not equal the end of national economy; the latter, qua political, social, and cultural economy, continues to be the basis for the former. Generalizations about the national economy, now as in the past, ignore the great diversity of conditions for particular national economies.
Just as individual political nations have developed particular national political cultures (Bendix 1977 (Bendix , 1978 , economic nations have their own economic cultures. Let us begin by illustrating the general concept with a concrete empirical example, drawn not from an earlier, now largely discredited literature on national character (Lamont 1995, 351) , but from contemporary political economy.
German economic culture is often traditionalist. Savings rates are high, and consumer credit, although increasing, remains low by comparison. Price competition is mitigated by socially established preferences for quality. Markets do not per se confer merit: social status and solidarity interfere, and security is regarded as important. Speculation is not valued.
Continuous monitoring of one's short-term balance of economic advantage is not a social norm, encouraging long-term orientations and commitments and supporting, among other things, a redistributive tax system. Professional competence is highly regarded for its own sake; German managers tend to be engineers and authority at the workplace is based on superior technical knowledge. Collectivism and discipline have given way as core cultural values to privacy and autonomy from organisational control and market pressure, as shown by strong cultural support for short working hours, low participation in paid employment, and a qualification-based organisation of work. (Streeck 1997) The same author (Streeck 1999 ) has also coined the phrase 'competitive solidarity' to underline nationalism's economic potential in global competitiveness.
A critical view of a-cultural, thin conceptions of economic society can also be found in recent studies of national legal cultures (Boyle 2000; Chua 1998 ), public administrative cultures (Kouzmin 1997; Macdonald and Thomas 1997) , and national 'repertoires of evaluation' (Lamont and Thevenot 2000) . The general social and cultural embeddedness of markets is studied by economic sociologists (Granovetter and Swedberg 1992; Fligstein 2001; White 2001 ) and economic anthropologists (Macfarlane 1987; Gudeman 1986; Halperin 1994; Hefner 1998) . The following points are particularly relevant. National economic cultures exist both as symbolic and as social systems, and as such can be mapped. Economic cultures have limited variation within a society, but strong variations between societies.
Part of the distinctiveness of individual national economies arises from the specific patterns of interaction between state and economy that have evolved over time.
These -in many respects nationally specific -roles of the state are examined in an extensive literature (Boyer and Drache 1996; Garrett 1998; Helleiner 1994; Iverson et al. 2000; Jessop 1999; Weiss 1998 Weiss , 2003 . This literature shows why and how even under the 'rule of the global economy' political economies are still governed by states. While economic globalization is a convenient shorthand for referring to changing global economic conditions, the decline or even end of the nation-state is not the other side of this coin. First, economic globalization has been engineered by certain nation-states and continues to be shaped by them. Second, given the continued significance of national economies, states remain the central actors in all political economies. Another literature with a long tradition (Gerschenkron 1962; Bendix1977) underscores the centrality of nation and culture in state formation, industrialization, postcommunist transformation, and stability and change in modern nation-states (Bönker et al. 2002; Linz and Stepan 1996; Steinmetz 1999) .
The Nationalism Literature
It should come as no surprise that the nationalism literature takes the national seriously. I briefly comment on it here in order to highlight some of the fundamental insights that this literature has recently generated. While the relationship between state and nation is a mainstay in the nationalism literature, it has paid relatively little attention to the relationship between the nation and the economy. 21 In part, this is a result of an unfortunate division of labour between students of nationalism, on the one hand, and students of political economy and students of management theory, on the other. One of the major results of current scholarly debates on nationalism is the demolition of the categorical distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism (i.e. good Western or liberal patriotism and bad non-Western or authoritarian nationalism) (Billig 1995; Spencer and Wollman 1998) . The upshot of this insight is that nationalism is increasingly conceived as a generic phenomenon that is in principle compatible with a variety of ideological content -from political liberalism (Miller 1995; Tamir 1993) to fascism, and from neoliberalism to new forms of protectionism (Helleiner and Pickel 2004) .
Another fundamental insight of the recent nationalism literature is that both as symbolic system (discourse and ideology) and as societal structure (nation-state societies), the nation has become a fundamental pattern that is constantly being reproduced globally in a variety of forms (Calhoun 1997; Gellner 1983; Kyvelidis 2000; Meyer et al. 1997) . As Charles Tilly has put it:
As in the cases of citizenship and democracy, nationalism exhibits the paradox of a general process characterized by path-dependent particularism. On one side, classic mechanisms of invention, ramification, emulation, and adaptation recur in the generation of nationalist claims. On the other side, each new assertion of nationalism responds to its immediate historical and cultural context, then modifies conditions for the next assertion of nationalism. Like all culturally constrained social processes, nationalism proceeds in cultural ruts that greatly limit the directions it can go, relies on collective learning, but by its very exercise alters relations -including shared understandings -among parties to its claims'. (Tilly 1999, 418) A third insight is that the national is not only symbolic and systemic structure, but also political action in the context of particular historical conditions, in particular the expansion of a global nation-state order (Beissinger 1996; Brubaker 1996 ; see also Tarrow 1994) . These novel insights represent the beginnings of a conscious linking of the nationalism literature to current debates in political science and sociology. In light of the theoretically extremely diverse if not chaotic state of this literature  Spillman/Faeges forthcoming), this development seems quite promising. That such bridging work is necessary is in part also due to the low level of attention the social sciences have afforded the subject of nation and nationalism in their theorizing.
However, on this side as well there seems to be a growing awareness that the significance of the national has been seriously neglected. Let us briefly survey recent developments in historical and cultural sociology.
Comparative Sociology
Marx, Durkheim and Weber did not provide much systematic theorizing on the nation that might have served as a foundation for subsequent studies. The revival of macro-sociology in the United States in the 1970s, associated with scholars such as Theda Skocpol (1979) and Charles Tilly (1975) , focused on bringing the state back in, leaving the nation on the sidelines of analysis. "In this intellectual field, a concern with understanding 'the nation' as a collective identity was suspect, associated, rightly or wrongly, with assumptions of value consensus which at best were untenable and at worst were coercive, and probably both. As cultural phenomena, 'nations' were peripheral to the main historical forces shaping modernity, since structures of domination such as the state could account for such collective identity formation and change" (Spillman/Faeges 203, 15) .
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A similar neglect of the sociological significance of national culture is also characteristic for the influential German sociologists Niklas Luhmann and Ulrich Beck.
The major theme of Luhmann's (1995) systems theory is the functional differentiation of contemporary society that has no overarching and integrating system as I claim is provided by a national culture connected to a sovereign state. Beck (1992) is preoccupied with individualization processes that run counter to the nationalizing processes which I argue continue to be fundamental even in postmodern societies in the age of globalization. As Schwinn (2001; my translation) has suggested in his analysis of the problem of order with reference to such systems and postmodern approaches:
The differentiated institutions have to remain connected with each other so that individuals are culture is seen to play a role in these problems of order. The debate has long been shaped by the abstract juxtaposition of "cosmopolitanism" vs "ethnic nationalism." From the perspective presented here, nationalism (whether strong or weak, more civic or more ethnic 27 ) is a general fact whereas cosmopolitanism is a utopian vision. Since this study is not primarily interested in normative problems of order but rather in the factual significance of the national, the cosmopolitan position is of interest only insofar as it claims that a political order can rest on a culturally neutral foundation.
Veit Bader (1997) has attempted to develop a differentiated concept of transnational political culture that can deal with the weaknesses of both radical positions.
He points out that mainstream liberal political philosophy has generally neglected cultures, habits, virtues, and practices. "Traditional liberalism ('liberalism 1') has underestimated the importance of communities and cultures. But liberal-democratic communitarianism or communitarian liberalism ('liberalism 2') has not yet fully addressed the exclusionary effects of communities and cultures." (Bader 1997, 772) Can the institutions, cultures, habits, and virtues of liberal democracy be treated as separate from the national? Political theorists aware of the problem of universalism vs particularlism have proposed "solutions" such as "liberal nationalism" (Tamir 1993; Kymlicka 1995; Miller 1995) , "constitutional patriotism" (Habermas 2001, esp. ch. 4) , "rooted cosmopolitanism" (Cohen 1995) , and "multiculturalism" (Taylor 1992 ). Bader (1997, 773) cautions that the "specific meanings of these concepts are, however, quite vague, particularly when it comes to [actual] institutional settings and political cultures and virtues." It seems that theorizing about the empirical significance of national culture has not moved beyond the implicit assumption that either it should be and can be ignored (mainstream liberalism) or that it cannot be dissociated from democratic institutions (communitarian liberalism). The former has thus little to contribute to the present discussion, whereas the latter recognizes the significance of the national for political theory, but leaves us with little more than the conclusion that "abstract or complete ethnic neutrality of the liberal-democratic state is unachievable empirically. As long as 'ought implies can,' it cannot be required normatively" (Bader 1997, 789) .
Concluding Comment
In order to conceptualize homo nationis, this paper has suggested the concept of social habitus. It has pointed out that habitus, which is not a mainstream social science concept, fundamental unit of analysis. First, the "national level" has often been used as a synonym for state or country. Second, it is not recommended as a basic level of analysis, but viewed as a basic social reality that has not been sufficiently recognized and properly studied. Third, as a social reality it has to be in every case historicized and contextualized rather than being theorized in general terms. Fourth, national habitus differs from "national character" in the important respect that it is not essentializing and homogenizing. Forms of national habitus are constantly changing, and they are composed of different, sometimes conflicting elements (such as world views, practices, rituals, values or attitudes). Fifth, social differentiation and individualization as fundamental social processes of modernity and postmodernity are not inconsistent with national habitus. In fact, both processes depend on the moral, cognitive and political resources and constraints that national habituses supply.
